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1,, 
The battered woman syndrome (BWS) describes a 
pattern of violence inflicted on a woman by her mate. In 
1979, Dr. Lenore Walker, one of the principal researchers 
in this field, published her seminal text, The Battered 
Woman. She described a battered woman as follows: 
A battered woman is a woman who is repeatedly 
subjected to any forceful physical or psychological 
behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do some-
thing he wants her to do without any concern for her 
rights. Battered women include wives or women in any 
form of intimate relationships with men. Furthermore, 
in order to be classified as a battered woman, the 
couple must go through the battering cycle at least 
twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive rela-
tionship with a man once. If it occurs a second time, 
and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a ·(~i battered woman. L. Walker, The Battered Woman xv 
(1979) 
Dr. Walker's initial findings were based on a nonrandom 
sample of 110 battered women who were mostly white 
and middle-class. A later study, published in her second 
book, involved a more representative sample of435 
women. In the second book, Walker defined the 
' syndrome by incidents of violence. "A battered woman is 
a woman ... who is or has been in an intimate relation-
ship with a man who repeatedly subjects or subjected 
i her to forceful physical and/or psychological abuse." Two 
acute battering incidents qualified as "repeated" incidents. 
L. Walker, The Battered Woman Syndrome 203 (1984). 
1 See also L. Walker, Terrifying Love: Why Battered Women 
Kill and How Society Responds (1989). 
CYCLE OF VIOLENCE 
phase, in which most injuries occur, the battering is out of 
control. Psychological abuse in the form of threats of 
future harm is also prevalent. 
The third phase is a calm, loving period during which 
the batterer is contrite, seeks forgiveness, and promises 
to refrain from future violence. This phase provides a 
positive reinforcement for the woman to continue the 
relationship in the hope that the violent behavior will not 
recur. The cycle then repeats itself. 
In addition, the batterer is often extremely jealous of 
the spouse's time and attention, a factor that further 
isolates-her from friends and outside support. Note, 
"Self-Defense: Battered Woman Syndrome on Trial," 20 
Cal. W. L. Rev. 485, 487 (1984). Moreover, numerous 
obstacles, both psychological and economic, often 
prevent the battered spouse from leaving her mate. 
Walker used Martin Seligman's theory of "learned help-
lessness" to explain the woman's condition. L. Walker, 
The Battered Woman at 43-54. 
In sum, the battered woman feels "trapped in a deadly 
situation." Walker, Thyfault & Browne, "Beyond the Juror's 
Ken: Battered Women," 7 Vermont L. Rev. 1, 12 (1982). 
Caught in this cycle, she sometimes strikes back and kills. 
CRITICISMS 
The evidentiary use of the BWS is not without its critics. 
In 1986, Professor Faigman questioned the validity of the 
underlying research: 
The prevailing theories of battered woman syndrome 
have little evidentiary value in self-defense cases. The 
work of Lenore Walker, the leading researcher on 
battered woman syndrome, is unsound and largely 
irrelevant to the central issues in such cases. The 
Walker cycle theory suffers from significant methode-
The violence associated with this type of relationship is logical and interpretative flaws that render it incapable 
neither constant nor random. Instead, it follows a pattern. of explaining why an abused woman strikes out at her 
Dr. Walker identified a three-stage cycle of violence. L. mate when she does. Similarly, Walker's application of 
Walker, The Battered Woman at 55-70. -learned helplessness to the situation of battered 
The first stage is the "tension building" phase; during women does not account for the actual behavior of 
, which small abusive episodes occur. These episodes many women who remain in battering relationships. ! gradually escalate over a period of time. Faigman, 'The Battered Woman Syndrome and Self-
i The tension continues to build until the second stage Defense: A Legal and Empirical Dissent," 72 Va. L. 
i. -the acute battering phase- erupts. During this Rev. 619, 647 (1986). 
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Faigman, however, does-argue that "courts should allow 
juries to consider valid social science research and the 
battered woman's own history of abuse in evaluating her 
self-defense claim." /d. at 622. 
Another critic wrote: "Reduced to its essence, 
battered-woman syndrome is not a physicians' diagnosis 
but an advocate's invention. It means: Blame the 
deceased." Caplan, "Battered Wives, Battered Justice," 
National Review 39, 40 (Feb. 1991). 
A 1992 revieW of the research literature, however, 
indicates that BWS now has attained, to a large extent, 
scientific acceptance. Citing a survey of experts in the 
field, Schuller and Vidmar conclude: 
The degree of expert consensus shown in the 
Dodge and Greene survey tends to suggest that the 
scientific literature bearing on a battered woman's 
circumstances and situation is sound. There are, 
however, some aspects of the testimony- the cycle 
pattern of violence and. the development of learned 
helplessness -that are not universal across battering 
relationships. Schuller & Vidmar, "Battered Woman 
Syndrome Evidence in the Courtroom: A Review of the 
Literature," 16 Law & Hum. Behav. 273, 281 (1992) 
(citing Dodge & Greene, ·~urors and Expert Conceptions 
of Battered Women," 6 Victims & Violence 271 (1991) 
(18-item survey of45 professionals who have published 
in the field)). 
The widespread legal acceptance of BWS is a product 
of the work of feminist scholars, who have attacked the 
traditional law of self-defense as based upon a male-
oriented perspective. Such scholarship, however, also 
recognizes tha:t the BWSmay perpetuate stereotypes: 
"Dweliingstere·orypes are lil<elyto become the focus of 
the trial process. While the prosecution attempts to 
discredit the defendanHomot"livingup to the standard of 
a 'good woman', the defense counters with an equally 
distorted portrayal of the defendant as ultra-feminine: a 
passive, helpless victim." Jenkins & Davidson, "Battered 
Women in the Criminal Justice System: An Analysis of 
Gender Stereotypes," 8 Behav. Sci. & Law 161, 169 (1990). 
See a/so Crocker, "The Meaning of Equality for 
Battered Women Who Kill Men in Self-Defense," 8 Harv. 
Women's L. J. 121, (1985) ("She is held liable for having 
lived as a woman, and she is held responsible for having 
reacted, even if only once, as a man"); S~hneider, 
"Describing and Changing: Womem'sSelf-Defense Work 
and the Problem of ,Exp~l1 Te§tim9nY pn Battering," 9 
Women's Rts. L. Rptr. 195, 216-17 (1986) ("Yet, to the 
degree that the explanation is perceived to focus on her 
suffering from a 'syndrome,' a term which suggests a loss 
of control and passivity, the testimony seems to be incon-
sistent with the notion of reasonableness ... "); Mahoney, 
"Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue 
of Separation," 90 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1991) ("Yet the expert 
testimony on battered woman syndrome and learned 
helplessness can interact with and perpetuate existing 
oppressive stereotypes of battered woman."). 
Another author suggests, however, that most proposals 
for law reform concerning this subject are based on two 
assumptions, both of which are wrong. The first assump-
tion is that a majority of cases involve non confrontational 
situations (e.g., spouse asleep or hired killer); however, a 
survey of the cases reveals that approximately 75% of 
2 
thg ca§es involve confrontations. Maguigan, "Battered 
Women and Self:Defense: MYths arid Misconceptions in 
Current Reform Proposals," 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 379, 397 
(1991) (surveying appellate decisions). The second 
assumption is that traditional self-defense law excluded a ~f 
female perspective. The author argues that while it is 
true that self-defense law developed in cases with male 
defendants, it is not true that the law ignored "the context 
of a battered woman's actions." /d. at 405. 
ADMISSIBILITY: SELF-DEFENSE 
The Cl.c!r:Tli.~§j!;>j!Lty~Qf E!X:pert testimony on BWS has 
produced much commentary and initially divided the 
courts. It was first introduced in the 1979 case of lbn-
Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 634-35 (D.C. 1979), 
aff'd on appeal after remand, 455 A.2d 893 (D.C. 1983). 
Several different evidentiary issues are raised. 
Relevancy · .· 
The first issue concerns the relevancy of BWS 
evidence. Typically, the evidence is offered in support of 
a self-defense claim in a homicide prosecution. A few 
courts have declared that BWS evidenc·e is simply irrele-
-vant to a self-d~fense claim. See People v. White, 90 Ill. 
App. 3d 1067, 1072-73, 414 N.E.2d 196, 200-01 (1980); 
State v. Necaise, 466-So. 2d 660, 663-65 (La. App. 1985); 
State v. Thomas, 66 Ohio St. 2d 518,521, 423 N.E.2d 137, 
140 (1981), overruled by State v. Koss, 49 Ohio St. 3d 213, 
551 N.E.2d 970, 974 (1990). 
This see·mswrong. While being a battered woman by 
itself is no defense to homicide, the syndrome may 
explain two elements of aself-defense claim: (1) the f( 
defendant's subjective fear of serious injury or death and 
(2) the reasonableness of that beliet See generally W. 
LaFave & AcScott,Criminal Law§5.7(2ded. 1984); 2 P. 
Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses§ 132 (1984). 
Numerous courts have recognized the relevancy of 
BWS evidence for this purpose. E.g., People v. Aris, 215 
Cal. App. 3d 1178, 1196-99,264 Cai.Rptr. 167, 179-81 
(1989); Terry v. State, 467 So. 2d 761, 763-64 (Fla. App. 
1985); Hawthorne v. State, 408 So. 2d 801, 806-07 (Fla. 
App. 1982); State v. Hundley, 236 Kan. 461, 467-69, 693 
P.2d 475,_ 479~8.0 (1985); State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d 892, 
894 (Me. 1981); State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 202-05, 478 
A.2d 364, 375~77-(1984); People v; Torres, 128 Misc.2d 
129, 133-34,488 N.Y.S.2d 358,362 (N.Y. Sup. 1985); State 
v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811,820 (N.D. 1983). See a/so 
May v. State, 460 So. 2d 778, 785 (Miss. 1984) ('[T]he 
battered wife syndrome has important informational and 
explanatory power .. ,"). 
For example, the evidence explains why a battered 
woman has not left her mate. According to the New 
Jersey Supreme Court, "[o]nly by understanding these 
unique pressures that force battered women to remain 
with their mates, despite their long-standing and 
reasonable fear of severe bodily harm and the isolation 
that being a battered woman creates, can a battered 
woman's state of mind be accurately and fairly under-
stood." State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 196, 478 A.2d 364, 372 
(1984). See a/so Fielder v. State, 756 S.W.2d 309, 319 
(Tex. Crim. App. 1988). 
Another court admitted BWS evidence to help explain 
a battered woman's conduct after killing her mate. People 
Faigman~ however, does argue that' 'courts should allow 
juries to consider valid social science research and the 
battered woman's own history of abuse in evaluating her 
seff~defense claim." /d. at 622. 
Another critic wrote: "Reduced to its essence, 
battered-woman syndrome is not a physicians' diagnosis 
but an advocate's invention. It means: Blame the 
deceased.'' Caplan, "Battered Wives, Battered Justice," 
National Review 39, 40 (Feb. 1991). 
A 1992 revieW of the research literature, however, 
indicates that BWS now has attained, to a large extent, 
scientific acceptance. Citing a survey of experts in the 
field, Scnullerand Vidmar conclude: 
Th~degree of expert consensus shown in the 
Dodge and Greene survey tends to suggest that the 
scientifid.fiterature bearing on a battered woman's 
circum'i.tanbes and situation is sound. There are, 
however, some aspects of the testimony- the cycle 
pattern of violence and the development of learned 
helplessn~ss- that are not universal across battering 
relationships. Schuller & Vidmar, "Battered Woman 
Syndrome Evidence in the Courtroom: A Review of the 
Literature," 16 Law & Hum. Behav. 273, 281 (1992) 
(citing Dodge & Greene, ':Jurors and Expert Conceptions 
ofBaUer~d Women," 6 Victims & Violenc~ 271 (1991) 
(18-ifemsurvey of 45 professionals who have published 
in the field)). 
The widespread legal acceptance of BWS is a product 
of the wo·rkof feminist scholars, who have attacked the 
traditional law of self-defense as based upon a male-
oriented perspective. Such scholarship, however, also 
recognizestnat the BWS may perpetuate stereotypes: 
·· "Dwelling· stereotypes are likely to become the focus of 
the trial. process. While the prosecution attempts to 
discretlitth·edefendantfomotliving up to the standard of 
a 'gooa Woman', the defense counters with an equally 
distorte(fportrayal of the defendant as ultra-feminine: a 
passive, helpless victim." Jenkins & Davidson, "BaUered 
Women in the Criminal Justice System: An Analysis of 
Gender Stereotypes," 8 Behav. Sci. & Law 161, 169 (1990). 
See also Crocker, "The Meaning of Equality for 
BaUeredWomen Who Kill Men in Self-Defense," 8 Harv. 
Warnell's L J. 121, (1985) ("She is held liable for having 
lived asavyoman, and she is held responsible for having 
reac;teg, e,§Em if only once, as a man"); Schneider, 
"bescri~ing and Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work 
andt!Ji.J~rPj:!l~m qf Expert Testimony on Battering," 9 
Won'refl~s-Rt$.L. Rpfr. 195, 216-17 (1986) ("Yet, tothe 
degree-thatthe explanation is perceived to focus on her 
sufferir)gfri:im a 'syndrome,' a term which suggests a loss 
ofcO'nTrorana passivity, the testimony seems to be incon-
sistent 'A/!th the notion of reasonableness ... "); Mahoney, 
"Legallmages of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue 
of Separation," 90 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1991) ("Yet the expert 
testimony.on battered woman syndrome and learned 
helplessness can interact with and perpetuate existing 
oppressive stereotypes of battered woman."). 
Another author suggests, however, that most proposals 
for law reform concerning this subject are based on two 
assumptions, both of which are wrong. The first assump-
tion is that a majority of cases involve nonconfrontational 
situations (e.g., spouse asleep or hired killer); however, a 
survey of the cases reveals that approximately 75% of 
2 
the cases involve confrontations. Maguigan, "Battered 
warfi·ena'nCi"seli:befense: MYths and-Misconceptions i 
CurrentReform Proposals," 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 379, 397 
(1991) (surveying appellate decisions). The second 
assumption is that traditional self-defense law excludec 
female perspective. The author argues that while it is 
true that self"defense law developed in cases with male 
defendants, it is not true that the law ignored "the conte 
of a baUered woman's actions." /d. at 405. 
ADMISSIBILITY: SElF-DEFENSE 
Iheadmissibility of expert testimony on BWS has 
produced rriiich commentary and initially divided the 
courts. It was first introduced in the 1979 case of lbn-
Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 634-35 (D.C. 197! 
aff'd on appeal after remand, 455 A.2d 893 (D.C. 1983). 
Several different evidentiary issues are raised. 
Relevancy _ 
The firstissue concerns the relevancy of BWS 
evidence. Typically, the evidence is offered in support c 
a self-defense claim in a homicide prosecution. A few 
courts have declared that BWS evidenc·e is simply irrel 
vantto aself-defense claim. See People v.White, 90 Ill 
App. 3d1067, 1072-73,414 N.E.2d 196,200-01 (1980); 
State v. Necaise, 466-So. 2d 660, 663,65 (La. App. 198! 
State v. Thomas, 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 521, 423 N.E.2d 1 
140 (1981), overruled by Statev. Koss, 49 Ohio St. 3d 2 
551 N.E.2d970, 974 (1990). 
This see·mswrong. While. being a battered woman b 
itself is no defense to homicide, the syndrome may 
explaintwoelements of aself"defense claim: (1) the 
defendant's subjective fear of serious injury or death a 
(2) the reasonableness of that belief. See generally W. 
LaFay€),~ Ac·":Scott, Criminal Law-.§ 5,7- (2d.ed.1984); 2 
Robinson; Criminal Law Defenses§ 1~2 (1984). 
Numerous courts have recognized the relevancy of 
BWS evidence for this purpose. E.g., People v. Aris, 21 
Cal. App. 3d 1178, 1196-99, 264 CaL Rptr. 167, 179-81 
(1989); Terry v. State, 467 So. 2d 761, 763-64 (Fla. App. 
1985); Hawthorne v. State, 408 So. 2d 801, 806-07 (Fia 
App. 1982); State v. Hundley, 236 Kan. 461, 467-69, 69: 
P.2d~l75,_ 47~"80 (1985); State v. Anaya; 438 A.2d 892, 
894 (Me;J91l1);StatE! v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178,202-05, 478 
A.2d 364; 375-77 (1984); PeopJev; Torres, 128 Misc.2d 
129, 133-34,488 N.Y.S.2d 358,362 (N.Y. Sup. 1985); S1 
v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811,820 (N.D. 1983). See a/sc 
May v. State, 460 So. 2d 778, 785 (Miss. 1984) ('[T]he 
battered wife syndrome has important informational a1 
explanatory power ... "). 
For example, the evidence explains why a battered 
woman has not left her mate. According to the New 
Jersey Supreme Court, "[o]nly by understanding thes 
unique pressures that force baUered women to rem air 
with theirmates, despite theirJong-standing and 
reasonable fear of severe bodily harm and the isolatio 
that being a battered woman creates, can a battered 
woman's state of mind be accurately and fairly under-
stood." State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 196,478 A.2d 364, 3 
(1984). See a/so Fielder v. State, 756 S.W.2d 309, 319 
(Tex. Grim. App. 1988). 
Another court admitted BWS evidence to help explc 
a battered woman's conduct after killing her mate. Pe< 
v. Minnis, 118111. App. 3d 345,356-57,455 N.E.2d 209, 
218 (1983) (BWS "might extend to [explain] dismember-
ment" of husband after killing, a point which the prosecu-
tion legitimately exploited.) 
Similarly, this evidence also would be admissible on 
the subjective fear element in a jurisdiction that recog-
nized "imperfect self-defense," which reduces murder to 
voluntary manslaughter. See People v. Aris, 215 Cal. App. 
3d 1178, 1199, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167, 181 (1989) (BWS 
evidence is relevant "to prove the honest belief require-
ment for both perfect and imperfect self-defense"); Note, 
"Partially Determined Imperfect Self-Defense: The Battered 
Wife Kills and Tells Why," 34 Stan. L. Rev. 615 (1982). 
Battered Child Defense 
In Statev. Janes, 64 Wash. App. 134, 822 P.2d 1238 
(1992), rev. granted, 119 Wash. 2d 1001, 832 P.2d 488 
(1992), these arguments were applied to a "battered 
child." The court reasoned that "[n]either law nor logic 
suggests any reason to limit to women recognition of the 
impact a battering relationship may have on the victim's 
actions or perceptions ... [C]hildren are both objectively 
and subjectively more vulnerable to ... violence than are 
adults." /d. at 142, 822 P.2d at 1243. 
Other courts have rejected this view, at least in 
nonconfrontational situations. See Whipple v. Duck-
worth, 957 F.2d 418, 421-24 (7th Cir. 1992) (exclusion of 
syndrome evidence did not violate constitution because 
accused offered no evidence that he was in immediate 
danger), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 218 (1992); Jahnke v. 
State, 682 P.2d 991, 1008 (Wyo. 1984) ("battered son" 
' testimony rejected because the defendant was not under 
1 attack at the time of the killing). 
See generally P. Mones, When a Child Kills: Abused 
Children Who Kill Their Parents (1991); Van Sambeek, 
"Parricide as Self-defense," 7 Law & Inequality 87 
(1988-89); Comment, "Killing Daddy: Developing a Self-
Defense Strategy for the Abused Child," 137 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 1281 (1989). 
Beyond Jurors Knowledge 
A second issue is whether BWS evidence is a proper 
subject for expert testimony. In 1981, the Ohio Supreme 
Court held that this subject is "within the understanding 
of the jury" and thus inappropriate for expert testimony. 
State v. Thomas, 66 Ohio St. 2d 518,521, 423 N.E.2d 137, 
140 (1981), overruled by State v. Koss, 49 Ohio St.3d 213, 
551 N.E.2d 970 (1990). 
Most courts disagree, finding that "a battering relation-
ship embodies psychological and societal features that 
are not well understood by lay observers." State v. Kelly, 
97 N.J. 178,209, 478 A.2d 364, 379 (1984). Accord Ibn-
lamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 634-35 (D.C. 1979), 
appeal after remand, 455 A.2d 893 (D.C. 1983); 
Hawthorne v. State, 408 So. 2d 801, 806 (Fla. App.), 
appeal dismissed, 415 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 1982); Smith v. 
State, 247 Ga. 612, 618-19, 277 S.E.2d 678, 683 (1981); 
People v. Torres, 128 Misc. 2d 129, 134, 488 N.Y.S.2d 358, 
1 362 (Sup. Ct. 1985); State v. Hill, 287 S.C. 398, 399, 339 
S.E.2d 121, 122 (1986); State v. Allery, 101 Wash. 2d 591, 
597, 682 P.2d 312, 316 (1984). 
The research appears to support this conclusion; it 
"suggests that jurors are misinformed on some aspects 
3 
of wife abuse and that some jurors are likely to be more 
misinformed than others. Nevertheless, the surveys have 
not found overwhelming endorsement of the 'myths' 
about abuse." Schuller & Vidmar, "Battered Woman 
Syndrome Evidence in the Courtroom: A Review of the 
Literature," 16 Law & Hum. Behav. 273, 283 (1992). 
Scientific Basis 
A final issue relates to the scientific basis for BWS 
evidence. Some courts excluded expert testimony on this 
subject because its scientific validity had not been suffi-
ciently established. lbn-Tamas v. United States, 455 A.2d 
893, 983-94 (D.C. 1983); State v. Thomas, 66 Ohio St. 2d 
518, 521-22, 423 N.E.2d.137, 140 (1981) (BWS not suffi-
ciently developed as scientific knowledge), overruled by 
State v. Koss, 49 Ohio St. 3d 213, 551 N.E.2d 970,974 
(1990); Buhrle v. State, 627 P.2d 1374, 1378 (Wyo. 1981) 
(record did not establish scientific basis). 
Rejecting this argument, other courts have concluded 
that a "sufficient scientific basis" has been established. 
State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 211,478 A.2d 364, 380 (1984). 
According to a federal district court, "[t]he general 
acceptance of expert testimony on the battered woman 
syndrome has been acknowledged by legal authorities 
as well as the scientific community." Fennell v. Goolsby, 
630 F. Supp. 451, 459 (E. D. Pa. 1985). Accord State v. 
Hennum, 441 N.W.2d 793, 797-99 (Minn. 1989); State v. 
Gallegos, 104 N.M. 247, 253, 719 P.2d 1268,1274 (N.M. 
App. 1986). 
As noted earlier, the research now supports the latter 
cases. 
Recent Trend 
The trend in the cases is to admit BWS evidence. See 
Note, "A Trend Emerges: A State Survey on the Admissi-
bility of Expert Testimony Concerning the Battered 
Woman Syndrome," 25 J. Fam. L. 373, 396 (1986-87) 
("The trend ... appears to be in the direction of admissi-
bility ... "); An not., "Admissibility of Expert or Opinion 
Testimony on Battered Wife or Battered Woman 
Syndrome," 1B A.L.R.4th 1153 (1982). 
For example, the Ohio Supreme Court has reversed its 
earlier position and admitted BWS evidence. State v. 
Koss, 49 Ohio St. 3d 213, 217, 551 N.E.2d 970, 974 (1990). 
Two states, including Ohio, have enacted statutes admit-
ting BWS evidence. See Mo. Ann. Stat. § 563.033 (1992 
Supp.); Ohio Rev. Code Ann.§§ 2901.06,2945.39, 
2945.392 (Baldwin 1992). See also State v. Williams, 787 
S.W.2d 308,311-12 (Mo. App. 1990) (statute applies to 
unmarried as well as married victims). 
Nevertheless, one court has held that the refusal to 
admit BWS evidence is not unconstitutional. Tourlakis v. 
Morris, 738 F. Supp. 1128, 1140 (S.D. Ohio 1990). 
limitations on Admissjbility 
Several limitations on admissibility should be noted. 
First, some courts permit experts to explain the 
syndrome only in general terms, describing the salient 
characteristics of BWS. Accordingly, the expert "should 
not be allowed to testify as to the ultimate fact that the 
particular defendant actually suffers from battered 
woman syndrome." State v. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d 793, 
799 (Minn. 1989). 
--$ecqnd; the-substantive .. law.ofselt~defense may limit 
admissibility. Traditional self~defense law requires "immi-
nent" danger of death or serious bodily injury. Typically, a 
kllfing irdne absellce of a confrontation falls outside this 
rule. Accordingly, several courts have held that a battered 
wife who kills a sleeping spouse cannot claim self-
defense. Eg., Statev. Stewart, 243 Kan. 639, 647-48, 763 · 
P.2d 572, 577-78 (1988); State v. Norman, 324 N.C. 253, 
261-68, 378 S.E.2d 8, 13-16 (1989). See generally 
Comment, "Rendering Each Woman Her Due: Can a 
Battered Woman Claim Self-Defense When She Kills Her 
Sleeping Batterer?," 38 U. Kan. L. Rev. 169 (1989). 
_§irriilai"[Y,sorne courts refuse to recognize the use of 
BW$ evidence in "rnurder-for-hire'~ cases. E.g., People v. 
Yakfich, 833 B2d 7sB, 1~0 (Colo. App. 1991); State v. 
Martin;66s:s.w:~a 895, ~99-900(I\J1o,.App. 1984). The 
opposil)g view is that the battered woman may justifiably 
believe she is in "imminent" danger even though she is 
not being beaten or threatened at the time of the killing. 
f3ecause ofthis problem, one commentator has 
argliedJI:IattheJegal definitici.tl ot~«W:defense is too 
restrictive and should be modified to recognize "psycho-
logical self-defense." Ewing, "Psychological Self-
Defense: A Proposed Justification for Battered Women 
Who Kill," 14 Law & Hum. Behav. 579 (1990). Others, 
however, have criticized this proposal: "The psychologi-
cal justification for the defense employs unacceptably 
soft science, and its legal support is confused and 
regressive." Morse, "The Misbegotten Marriage of Soft 
Psychology and Bad Law: Psychological Self-Defense as 
a Justification for Homicide," 14 Law & Hum. Behav. 595, 
595-96 (1990). 
See a/so Greenwald, Tomkins, Kenning & Zavodny, 
"PsycfiOiogicarSelf:Defense Jury Instructions: Influence 
on Verdicts for Battered Women Defendants," 8 Behav. 
ScL&'Law 171(1990). 
ADMISSIBILITY: OTHER CASES 
BWS evidence has been offered for purposes other 
than self-defense. In most of these cases the syndrome 
is used by the prosecution rather thanJhe defense. 
lnArcoren v. United States, 929 F.2d 1235 (8th Cir. 
1991); cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 312 (1991), the defendant 
was charged with aggravated sexual abuse. His es-
tranged wife reported the assault but theh recanted her 
grand jury.testimony.at trial. The prosecution introduced 
t:3W$.evlc:leru;e.tqe~plfi.Jnthewife'sconduct. On appeal 
the Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding ''no persuasive 
reason" to limit BWS testimony "to cases in which it is 
offered to bolster a claim of self-defense." /d. at 1241. 
··other cases have reached a similar result. In State v. 
Bl:lker, 120N.H. 773, 775-76,424 A.2d 171, 172-73 (1980), 
the court upheld the introduction of BWS evidence to 
rebut an insanity defense in the trial of a husband for the 
attempted murder of his wife. 
In State v. Ciskie, 110 Wash. 2d 263, 281, 751 P.2d 1165, 
1170-71 (1988), BWS evidence was admitted in a rape 
prosecution to explain why the victim had not left the 
defendant or reported the abuse. 
As one court has noted: "It would seem anomalous to 
allow a battered woman, where she is a criminal defen-
dant, to offer this type of expert testimony in order to help 
the jury understand the actions she took, yet deny her 
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thatsame_Qpportunityw_he_n §D§ is th(3 complaining 
witness and/or victim and her abuser is the criminal 
defendant.'' State v. Frost, 242 N.J. Super. 601, 612, 577 
A.2d 1-282, 1287 (A.D.), cert. denied, 127 N.J. 321, 604 
A.2d 596 (1990). See generally Note, "Using Battered 
Woman Syndrome Evidence in the Prosecution of a 
Batterer," 76 Iowa L. Rev. 553 (1991) (offering prosecutors 
guidelines for the introduction of BWS evidence). 
BWS evidence has also beem introduced in sentencing 
proceedings. E.g., United States v. Johnson, 956 F.2d 
894, 901-02 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Whitetail, 956 
F.2d 857, 864 (8th Cir. 1992) (Sentencing guidelines 
"permitconsideration otl:>atl~J.ecl~Y'{Qr:n_c:m syndrome as a 
basis for departure from the guidelines.") 
RELATED ISSUES 
Several other issues concerning the battered wife 
syndrome. have arisen. One court has ruled it error for 
the prosecution to rebut BWS evidence with evidence of 
the defendant's prior aggressive acts toward the victim. 
State v. Kelly, 102 Wash. 2d 188; 193~99, 685 P.2d 564, 
569-71 (1984). This type of rebuttal evidence is inadmissi· 
ble because it is character evidence. 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
Several cases raise claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. In one case the Sixth Circuit ruled that a 
defense counsel's failure to introduce expert testimony 
on the battered woman syndrome did not constitute 
ineffective assistance. Meeks v. Bergen, 749 F.2d 322, 
328-29(6th Cir. 1984). 
In another case, however, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court reached the opposite result. Commonwealth v. 
Stonehouse, 521 Pa. 41,57-58, 555A2d 772, 781 (1989) 
(failure to introduceBWS evidence constituted ineffectivE 
assistance of counsel). 
A California appellate court concurred in a case where 
defense counsel admitted that he had "never heard" of 
such a defense, and BWS evidence would have helped 
dispel "many of the commonly held misconceptions 
about battered woman. As the record reflect[ed), the 
prosecutor exploited several of these misconceptions in 
urging the jUry to reject appellant's self-defense claim." 
People v.Diiy, 2 Cal. App. 4th 405, 416, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
916, 922 (1992). 
Victim. Examinations 
The courts are split on whether a defendant who 
intends to introduce BWS evidence is required to submit 
to an examination by prosecution experts. 
In United States v. Vega-Penarete, 137 F. A.D. 233 
(E. D. N.C. 1991), the court ruled that the prosecution 
"should have the opportunity to respond to the defen-
dant's expert testimony on the Battered Wife Syndrome 
with testimony of its expert who has also examined the 
defendant." /d. at 235. See a/so State v. Briand, 130 N.H. 
650, 657-58, 547 A.2d 235, 240 (1988) (independent 
evaluation required); State v. Myers, 239 N.J. Super. 158, 
169-70, 570 A.2d 1260, 1266 (same), cert. denied, 127 
N.J. 323,604 A.2d 598 (1990). 
In Hickson v. State, 589 So. 2d 1366, 1369 (Fla. App. 
1991), however, a Florida appellate court held that offer-
ing BWS evidence did not waive the Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination, and thus an examina-
tion by a prosecution expert was impermissible. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court in State v. Hannum, 
441 N.W.2d 793, 799-800 (Minn. 1989), resolved the issue 
on different grounds. The court ruled that only general-
ized information about BWS is admissible, and thus a 
defense expert is not permitted to express an opinion 
about the particular defendant. This rule of limited 
admissibility obviates the need tor an adverse examina-
tion by prosecution experts because defense experts will 
not be allowed to testify based upon a defense examina-
tion of the defendant. 
See generally Comment, "A Critique and Proposed 
Solution to the Adverse Examination Problem Raised by 
Battered Woman Syndrome Testimony in State v. 
Hennum," 74 Minn. L. Rev. 1023 (1990). 
Right to Expert Assistance 
Finally, an indigent defendant may have the right to 
expert assistance in introducing BWS evidence. In Dunn 
v. Roberts, 963 F.2d 308 (10th Cir. 1992), the 10th Circuit 
ruled that the accused had such a right in support of a 
duress defense. 
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